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Abstract. A fault-tolerant routing algorithm in Network-on-Chip archi-
tectures provides adaptivity for on-chip communications. Adding fault-
tolerance adaptivity to a routing algorithm increases its design complex-
ity and makes it prone to deadlock and other problems if improperly
implemented. Formal verification techniques are needed to check the
correctness of the design. This paper performs formal analysis on an
extension of the link-fault tolerant Network-on-Chip architecture intro-
duced by Wu et al that supports multiflit wormhole routing. This paper
describes several lessons learned during the process of constructing a for-
mal model of this routing architecture. Finally, this paper presents how
the deadlock freedom and tolerance to a single-link fault is verified for a
two-by-two mesh version of this routing architecture.
Keywords: LNT, process algebra, fault-tolerant routing, Network-on-
Chip, formal verification
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) nowadays have ubiquitous applications in many
safety critical areas such as avionics, traffic control, robust medical devices, etc.
As an example, the automotive industry makes active use of CPS: modern vehi-
cles can have up to 80 electronic control units (ECUs), which control and operate
everything from the engine and breaks to door locks and electric windows. Cur-
rently, each ECU is statically tied to its specific sensors and actuators. This
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means that processing power between different ECUs cannot be shared, which
degrades the performance of the chip due to imbalanced workload on each ECU.
More importantly, this structure is susceptible to faults in that if an ECU fails,
it causes a malfunction in the corresponding sensor and/or actuator. With the
advances in semiconductor technology, it is now possible to have multiple cores
on a single chip which communicate using a Network-on-Chip (NoC) paradigm.
A NoC approach allows flexible mapping between ECUs and sensors/actuators,
which makes it possible for ECUs to share processing power and tolerate faults
by having spare units. Some example fault-tolerant NoC architectures currently
being developed include those described in [1] and [2].
This paper presents the verification of a NoC architecture that supports the
link-fault tolerant routing algorithm [3] extended to a multiflit wormhole rout-
ing setting. In particular, deadlock freedom and single link-fault tolerance are
formally verified using the CADP toolbox. This paper also presents several key
lessons that are learned during the evolution of the model of the NoC architec-
ture. Finally, this paper describes several remaining challenges to the verification
of this and similar systems.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work. Sec-
tion 3 describes the extended NoC architecture and routing algorithm. Section 4
presents several case studies of the process that led to the final NoC model. Sec-
tion 5 presents verification results for deadlock freedom and the single-link fault
tolerance property. Section 6 discusses the insights obtained from using model
checking in the design of the NoC behavior and some future research directions.
2 Related Work
A fully functional NoC system has to be fault-tolerant and free of deadlocks. A
variety of approaches have been proposed for fault-tolerant NoC routing. One
approach is to use a reconfigurable routing table in which pre-computed routes
are stored to avoid faulty links [4]. This method, however, is not adaptive, so it
can only avoid permanent faults. An example of a dynamic faulty link detection
mechanism is described in [5], but this method only avoids deadlocks rather than
ensuring they cannot occur. The Glass/Ni fault-tolerant routing algorithm, on
the other hand, guarantees deadlock freedom by disallowing certain turns in the
network [6], so that communication cycles cannot occur. This algorithm, how-
ever, uses the node-fault model, where a fault in an incoming link is interpreted
as the complete node failing. Not only does this mean losing the ability to route
to an otherwise functional node, but if the node does not actually stop oper-
ating, it can potentially introduce deadlock in the network. A modified version
proposed in [7] achieves one link-fault tolerance by introducing a mechanism to
forward link fault locations to a neighboring routing node allowing for a route
selection that avoids the faulty link. This fault forwarding method though can
still result in a deadlock at the edges of the mesh network, so in these cases, it
must revert to the node-fault model. An improvement proposed in [3] is capable
of handling link faults anywhere in the network. Potential deadlock is avoided by
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allowing a router to drop a packet to prevent the occurrence of a communication
cycle, and it is an extended version of this algorithm that this paper attempts
to formally verify.
Concerning NoC verification, [8] proposed GeNoC (Generic Network-on-
Chip), a formal NoC model implemented in the ACL2 theorem prover. Its exten-
sion in [9] verifies a non-minimal adaptive routing algorithm. These techniques,
however, require user assistance on writing proof obligations. On the other hand,
to facilitate the use of model checking techniques, automatic translations are de-
veloped from the asynchronous hardware description language CHP (Commu-
nicating Hardware Processes) to networks of automata [10] and to the process
algebraic language LOTOS [11,12]. The latter approach is applied to verify two
complex asynchronous designs, one of which is an input controller of an asyn-
chronous NoC [13] that implements a deadlock-free routing algorithm based on
the odd-even turn model [14]. However, this NoC does not handle failures.
3 Network-on-Chip Architecture and Routing Algorithm
Figure 1 shows an architecture for a two-by-two mesh composed of four corner
routing nodes, all with a similar structure. This architecture implements an
extended version of the routing algorithm described in [3]. The original algorithm
assumed single-flit packets and that each node could route only a single packet
at a time, while this modified architecture allows each node to potentially have
multiple multi-flit packets in flight at a time. For example, node 00 may be
routing a packet from node 01 to node 10, while simultaneously routing a packet
from node 10 to node 01. These extensions though complicate the algorithm, so
it is desirable to be able to prove that this extended architecture is still deadlock-
free and continues to achieve fault tolerance to a single-link failure, which is the
goal of this paper.
The routing algorithm works as follows. Each node communicates with its
corresponding processing element (PE), and when a PE xy wishes to send a
packet to another node x′y′, it injects that packet into the network via its router
(r PE xy). Based upon the intended destination of the packet, the router de-
termines a direction to forward the packet. To guarantee deadlock freedom, the
routing algorithm disallows certain turns in the network. Namely, a packet that
is moving north in the network is not allowed to turn to the west, and a packet
moving east in the network is not allowed to turn to the south. Hence, in order
to avoid “illegal turns”, each router sends packets south and west, as needed,
before sending them north and east. After selecting a direction, the router at-
tempts to communicate with the arbiter in charge of the desired link. At this
point, one of three things can occur. First, the link may be busy, and the router
must wait its turn to use the link. Second, the link may be faulty, and the router
is instructed to find an alternate route. Finally, the link may be free, and the
arbiter may non-deterministically select to communicate with this router over
any other routers that may be trying to obtain this link. The arbiter then for-
wards the packet one flit at a time to the succeeding router (i.e., the router the
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the four routing nodes in a two-by-two mesh.
output of the arbiter is connected to), which then executes the same algorithm.
Once a packet reaches its destination x′y′, the packet is absorbed by the arbiter
connected to its PE (arb PE x′y′).
Assuming there is at most one link-fault, an alternate route always exists, but
it may require an illegal turn. For example, assume that node 10 wishes to send
a packet to node 01. In this case, a west then north route is desired, but let us
assume that arb W 10 reports a fault on its link to r E 00. In this case, r PE 10
must communicate with arb N 10 instead. Once the packet reaches r S 11, this
router must make the illegal turn and route the packet west through arb W 11.
However, arb W 11 may be busy routing a packet from node 11 to node 00. This
packet though may be blocked because arb S 01 is busy routing a packet from
node 01 to node 10. Similarly, this packet may be blocked because arb E 00 is
busy routing a packet from node 00 to node 11. Finally, this packet is blocked
because arb N 10 is busy due to the packet from node 10 to node 01. Therefore,
there is a communication cycle causing a deadlock In this case, arb W 11 sends
a negative acknowledgement to r S 11 to tell this router to drop the incoming
packet, which removes the communication cycle and the potential for deadlock.
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Fig. 2. A counterclockwise routing model.
4 Formal Models of NoCs
This section describes the challenges in developing a formal model of the two-by-
two mesh shown in Figure 1. Our initial informal model of the two-by-two mesh
uses asynchronous channels implemented in a VHDL package [15] which had to
be translated into a formal model in the process algebraic language LNT [16] to
enable verification using the CADP toolbox [17].
4.1 One Direction Routing
The first model developed and verified is the simple one direction routing model
shown in Figure 2. It is advantageous to construct a model with one complete
cycle consisting of partial components from each node, since the model is simple
enough for testing asynchronous communications between any two components.
Also, the resultant state space is manageable, which enables the efficient checking
for deadlock and packet loss without having to abstract the model. Since this
model only has the counterclockwise routing direction, there are no alternative
routes available, avoiding the need to model route forwarding computation in
each router. Having only the counterclockwise routing direction also forces the
north-to-west illegal turn to occur on the northeast node. In this first model,
each PE router only generates one single-flit packet destined to the node in its
diagonal direction. For example, the PE connected to node 01 sends a packet
to node 10. After emitting one packet, each PE router becomes inactive. No
components absorb any packets and it is assumed that no link fault exists in
the network. The expected behavior is that the packet from node 10 to node 01
gets dropped due to deadlock avoidance, and the remaining three packets keep
cycling through nodes in the network forever, and no deadlock exists.
The arbiter, arb W 11, on the northeast corner is responsible for detecting
the potential deadlock by checking availability of its succeeding router r E 01. To
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avoid deadlock, it informs its preceding router r S 11 to drop the packet when
router r E 01 is not available. The LNT descriptions of arb W 11 and r S 11
are shown in Figure 3. The three gates “PEr_Wa_11”, “Sr_Wa_11”, and “n11_n01”
(between square brackets) of the “arbiter_nack” process correspond to the three
links (r PE 11 → arb W 11), (r S 11 → arb W 11), and (arb W 11 → r E 01)
in Figure 2, respectively. The contents of each flit is represented by a natural
number, and the arbiter process uses the variable “one_flit” of type Nat to store
the flit travelling through it. The behavior of this process is a non-terminating
loop with two nested choices (select6). The outer choice decides whether the
arbiter is ready to receive a packet7: if its preceding router r E 01 confirms its
availability by synchronizing on the “n11_n01” gate with the arbiter, then it
starts to receive the packet; or the arbiter issues a negative acknowledgement
“Sr_Wa_11(false)” to r S 11 indicating that its output is blocked by another
packet. If both options are available, one is chosen nondeterministically. When
the arbiter is ready to receive a packet, it nondeterministically chooses between
the PE router, r PE 11, and the south router, r S 01. Since taking a packet from
r S 01 effectively makes an illegal turn, this arbiter first sends an acknowledge-
ment “Sr_Wa_11(true)” to r S 11. The router r S 11 (represented by the LNT
process “router_drop_pkt”) checks the received status of arb W 11, and a false
status leads to a packet drop: r S 11 is ready to receive the next packet which
overwrites the current one that needs to be dropped.
The generated state space for the counterclockwise routing model contains
terminal states, indicating deadlocks in the model. Analysis of the diagnostic
sequences of transitions reveals that all four packets can get dropped by the
r S 11 router, which is an unexpected behavior. According to the routing proto-
col, r S 11 should drop a packet when arb W 11 returns a false status, and the
arbiter should do so only when its output, r E 01, is busy serving other packets.
As mentioned previously, it is possible that one packet is dropped for this reason,
but the remaining three should stay in the network as the network is not con-
gested anymore. Analysis of the outer choice on the arbiter’s specification shows
that there always exists a path where it sends a negative acknowledgement to
tell the router r S 11 to drop its packet. The nondeterministic choice enables
sending both, a true and a false acknowledgement to the router, and as long as
the gate rendezvous for sending a false acknowledgement is possible, it gets a
chance to occur. Therefore, arb W 11 can always send a false acknowledgment
regardless of potential deadlocks.
One possible improvement is to have a prioritized choice: the option of send-
ing a positive acknowledgement is always the preferred one. Ideally, availability
of the preferred positive option should prevent the option of sending the negative
acknowledgement. To implement this priority would require that the “select”
operator could probe the possibility of a gate rendezvous on the preferred choice.
Implementing the priority choice in LNT requires additional processes [18], which
6 The LNT construction “select A [] B end select” is a non-deterministic choice
between A and B.
7 In LNT, comments start with “--” and extend to the end of the line.
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process arbiter_nack [PEr_Wa_11 , Sr_Wa_11 , n11_n01 : any] is
var one_flit : Nat in loop
select
n11_n01; -- Router r_E_01 is ready to accept packet
select
PEr_Wa_11 (? one_flit ); -- Receive packet from r_PE_11
n11_n01(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
[] Sr_Wa_11(true); -- Send positive ack. to r_S_11
Sr_Wa_11 (? one_flit ); -- Receive packet from r_S_11
n11_n01(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
end select
[] Sr_Wa_11(false) -- Send negative ack. to r_S_11
end select
end loop end var end process
process router_drop_pkt [n10_n11 , Sr_Wa_11 : any] is
var status : Bool , one_flit : Nat in loop
n10_n11; -- Ready to accept packet from arb_N_10
n10_n11 (? one_flit ); -- Receive packet from arb_N_10
Sr_Wa_11 (? status ); -- Request arb_W_11 ’s status
-- Send packet to arb_W_11 ONLY on TRUE status
if status then Sr_Wa_11(one_flit) end if
end loop end var end process
Fig. 3. The LNT processes for arb W 11 and r S 11.
may lead to state explosion. Even if it can be verified, the packet leakage path
may not get removed due to the timing of when the probes are executed. An-
other option is to prune the unwanted execution paths from the generated state
space using the priority operator in EXP.OPEN/SVL [19]. However, since the
state space of the entire model is generated compositionally using branching
bisimulation, which is not a congruence for the priority operator [20].
4.2 Removing Arbiter’s Buffering Ability
After all components on the two-by-two mesh are built and connected as shown
in Figure 1, the state space generation quickly becomes a challenge due to the
state explosion problem. After only 10 of the 24 LNT processes are composed
during verification, the state space already has reached 679,284 states, and then
adding one more process leads to a state space in excess of 3 million states.
Clearly, this state space growth is unmanageable. As mentioned previously, this
new architecture allows multiple packets to go through one node at the same
time, and the interleavings of gate rendezvous among different routing nodes
is a major contributor to the exponential increase of state count. Moreover, in
most cases, gate rendezvous happens with offers, which are the concrete data
packets. Since there are four different packet data values, each representing the
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destination location information as described in Section 4.1, interleaving of gate
rendezvous is a significant source of this state explosion.
One improvement investigated to alleviate the state explosion problem is to
reduce gate rendezvous between arbiters and routers in each node. This means
that on the LNT model level, routers and arbiters in one node are merged into
one process, removing the need for gate rendezvous between them. The resultant
northwest routing node has the following behavior. It nondeterministically selects
one among the following three operations: generating its own packet, receiving a
packet from the northeast node, or receiving one from the southeast node. Once
the node has a packet, based on the packet’s destination, it attempts to send
out the packet to the first choice of route, and tries alternative routes if the first
one is not available. All the other three nodes have a similar behavior.
This simplification of the routing nodes indeed helps to reduce the state space.
However, it removes the buffering capacity in each arbiter, and consequently
causes deadlocks. A typical deadlock scenario is that initially the four routing
nodes generate their own packets at the same time, between the northwest and
southwest nodes, and between the northeast and southeast nodes, the packet in
one node tries to go the other. No nodes can make progress in this situation.
To send a packet, a node needs its neighboring node to communicate on the
same gate. It is required because the node’s own arbiter, which connects to the
neighboring node, cannot store anything, and only the neighboring node has the
storing capacity. However, if the neighboring node is trying to do the same thing
to this node in the mean time, neither one can succeed in delivering packets
because both are waiting for the other to accept their own packets. Removal
of the arbiter’s buffering ability also renders it impossible for one node to have
multiple packets passing through it at the same time.
From this experiment, we conclude that arbiters in the network need storage
capacity in order to relay a packet, freeing up their corresponding routing nodes
to handle other communications. It also implies that simplifications on the node
architecture without modifying the routing algorithm can introduce deadlocks
in the system behavior. Therefore, removing interleavings of gate rendezvous on
the LNT models is unsuccessful.
4.3 Finding Proper Data Abstractions
As mentioned earlier, another major contributor to the large state space is the
existence of many data values in the model. The previous experiments do not
consider data abstraction of a packet’s content, because a router requires the
packet’s destination to decide its next forwarding direction: it is impossible for
a router to perform routing computation without the destination information,
although this information is only needed by the routers. In theory, all except the
PE routers can receive packets destined to all node locations in a mesh. Since our
link-fault tolerant routing algorithm allows illegal turns (c.f. Section 3), it means
that a router may potentially direct packets to all of its viable directions. The
idea is, thus, to abstract the routing algorithm using nondeterministic choice.
In other words, after receiving a packet, a router nondeterministically selects
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either its own node, indicating that the packet has reached its destination, or
one of the (many) forwarding directions for the packet, without the need to
examine the packet’s destination. This abstraction enables us to eliminate a
packet’s destination information. Moreover, since every packet is provided with
a preferred route and at least one alternative route for the purpose of fault-
tolerance, the router’s model should provide, in the non-deterministic choice, the
possibility for every forwarding direction as the preferred route for a randomly
destined packet, assuming the router does not perform an illegal turn. From the
analysis of the routing algorithm, it is obvious that making an illegal turn is
never a preferred choice for a route unless all forwarding routes of a router are
illegal. For example, the north-to-east legal turn is always a preferred choice over
the illegal north-to-south turn at router r S 01 in Figure 1.
In a two-by-two mesh, there are three types of routers. First, there are routers
r S 11 and r W 11 that can make two illegal turns (RI2). Next, there are routers
r W 10 and r S 01 which can make one illegal turn (RI1). Finally, there are
all other routers which never make illegal turns. Since routers in each of the
three categories have the same abstract behavior, the rest of this section uses
representatives, i.e., RI2, RI1, and RI0, to refer to routers in each category.
The next question is whether packets need to be modeled at all. Our first
experiment shows that the model without packet information exhibits the packet
leakage problem. As discussed in Section 4.1, the reason is an intrinsic feature
of RI2, which has a nondeterministic choice where to send a packet: either to
RI2 itself or to an illegal forwarding direction. Without any packet information,
taking an illegal forwarding direction is always possible, regardless of deadlock
avoidance, effectively creating a leakage path. To fix this problem, an abstraction
of a packet has to be included such that an illegal turn in RI2 is not always
possible. An important feature of the routing pattern is that a packet takes an
illegal turn only after its attempt to the preferred route fails due to a failure
on the route. In other words, when a packet makes an illegal turn, it must have
been diverted at least once before. Thus, a packet can be modeled as a single-bit
Boolean variable, indicating whether the packet has been diverted or not. In
the LNT process “router_two_illegal” modeling RI2 shown in Figure 4, only a
diverted packet can take illegal turns. This restriction rules out the possibility
of dropping packets which have not taken an alternate route yet.
Comparing the precise routing decision computation with the nondetermin-
istic choice in the abstract model, a packet destined to one forwarding direction
in the concrete model has the possibility to be forwarded to any routing di-
rection in the abstract model. Therefore the abstraction is conservative in that
it preserves all transition sequences in its corresponding concrete model. One
subtle difference introduced in the abstract model is the notion of a diverted
packet, which does not exist in the concrete model. It is, however, a feature that
implicitly exists in the concrete model’s routing behavior.
There are also three categories of arbiters, corresponding to the router cat-
egories. Figure 5 shows the arbiter corresponding to RI2. It selects between its
PE router and two routers, flits from which may just have made an illegal turn.
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process router_two_illegal [input , out_arb_PE , out1_illegal ,
out2_illegal , drop : any] is
var one_flit , arb_status : Bool in loop
input(? one_flit );
select
out_arb_PE(one_flit)
[]
if one_flit == true then -- packet is diverted
-- first try out1_illegal , then out2_illegal
out1_illegal (? arb_status );
if arb_status == true then
out1_illegal(one_flit)
else
out2_illegal (? arb_status );
if arb_status == true then
out2_illegal(one_flit)
else
drop -- both illegal turns impossible
end if
end if
end if
end select
end loop end var end process
Fig. 4. The LNT process for the RI2 router.
For each option the arbiter takes, after receiving a flit, it keeps rejecting re-
quests from RI2 routers until it delivers the flit. When receiving rejections on
all its illegal forwarding routes, RI2 drops the packet to prevent potential dead-
lock. The complete LNT specification for the two-by-two NoC is available at
http://www.async.ece.utah.edu/~zhangz/research/lnt_modeling/.
5 Verification Results
Verification of the NoC model consists of two steps: generating the Labeled Tran-
sition System (LTS) from the LNT specification, and then analyzing the LTS
to verify properties of interest. The LTS for each investigated model is gener-
ated compositionally, i.e., by generating and minimizing the LTSs for each pro-
cess separately before combining them to the LTS of the complete system. For
the combination steps, our verification applied smart reduction [21], which uses
heuristics to find an optimal ordering of composition and minimization steps to
keep the intermediate state spaces manageable. Minimization is performed with
respect to divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation equivalence [22]. Thus,
any livelocks found are preserved during composition, whereas using standard
branching bisimulation would collapse every livelock into a deadlock. In other
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process arbiter_nack_2 [in_PE_router , in1_illegal ,
in2_illegal , arb_out : any] is
var one_flit : Bool in loop
select
in_PE_router(true); in_PE_router (? one_flit );
loop L1 in select
arb_out(one_flit ); break L1
[] in1_illegal(false)
[] in2_illegal(false)
end select end loop -- L1
[]
in1_illegal(true); in1_illegal (? one_flit );
loop L2 in select
arb_out(one_flit ); break L2
[] in1_illegal(false)
[] in2_illegal(false)
end select end loop -- L2
[]
in2_illegal(true); in2_illegal (? one_flit );
loop L3 in select
arb_out(one_flit ); break L3
[] in1_illegal(false)
[] in2_illegal(false)
end select end loop -- L3
end select
end loop end var end process
Fig. 5. The LNT process for the arbiter corresponding to RI2.
words, divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation can reveal true deadlock sce-
narios. The three properties of interest are: (1) the link-fault tolerant routing
algorithm is free of deadlocks; (2) given at most one failure link, it is never the
case that a router is unable to route a packet; and (3) given at most one failure
link, a packet never gets dropped when there is only one packet in the network.
Table 1 shows the LTS information for nine two-by-two mesh models: the
first row represents a mesh without any link failure, and the remaining eight
rows each represent the same NoC with one failure link whose location is shown
in the first column. The columns under “Intermediate LTS” show the number of
states and transitions of the largest intermediate LTS, and the columns under
“Final LTS” show those of the final LTS. The two columns under “Performance”
display the maximal amount of allocated virtual memory (in MB) and the total
execution time (in s) to generate each LTS. A desktop machine with a CPU of
eight 3.60 GHz cores and 16GB of available RAM is used to generate the results
listed in this table. One core is used at any time for the parallel composition and
state minimization steps. The last column shows the labels of each LTS.
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Table 1. LTS’s for two-by-two NoCs.
Failure Interm. LTS Size Final LTS Performance Labels
Link States Transitions St. Tr. RAM Time
none 6,295,773 83,386,208 1 1 32,945 5,976 i
01→ 00 20,340 193,726 41 224 111 83 i, drop Sr 11, drop Wr 11
01→ 11 1,369,068 18,221,153 1 3 4,039 499 i, drop Sr 01, drop Sr 11
00→ 10 6,560 50,688 21 104 111 80 i, drop Sr 11, drop Wr 11
00→ 01 6,560 50,688 21 104 111 81 i, drop Wr 11, drop Sr 11
10→ 11 122,724 1,269,981 1 3 111 89 i, drop Wr 10, drop Wr 11
10→ 00 20,340 193,726 41 224 111 80 i, drop Wr 11, drop Sr 11
11→ 01 367,200 4,172,652 1 3 111 106 i, drop Sr 11, drop Wr 11
11→ 10 367,200 4,172,652 1 3 111 105 i, drop Sr 11, drop Wr 11
The final LTS for each model is generated by hiding all gates that represent
the links between the routers and the arbiters. The only two visible types of gates
are the route-failure gates and the packet-drop gates. Rendezvous on the former
happen when a router has exhausted all options to forward a packet; rendezvous
on the latter occur when a router drops a packet. These gates are left visible to
facilitate the verification tasks (2) and (3) described above. To model a single
link fault in LNT, a working arbiter process is replaced by an arbiter that sends
false status to all its connected input routers.
The final LTSs show similarities between the following pairs: (01→ 00, 10→
00),(01 → 11, 10 → 11), (00 → 10, 00 → 01), (11 → 01, 11 → 10). All visible
labels on these LTSs are packet-drop labels. Based on the three types of the
router introduced previously, renaming these labels to “drop-at-RI2”, and “drop-
at-RI1” produces bisimilarity between the two LTSs in each pair.
Since deadlock freedom is a global property and is not always possible to
be inferred from local LTS states, generating the global LTS is necessary. A
system has a deadlock if its LTS contains a state/transition sequence that starts
from the initial state and ends in a terminal state, i.e., a state without outgoing
transitions. Deadlock detection then becomes a search for such states in the LTS.
Using the CADP toolbox, it is found that no such sequence exists in any NoC’s
LTS in Table 1. Since the entries in this table cover all possible one-link fault
configurations, we can conclude that the link-fault tolerant algorithm is free of
deadlock for a two-by-two mesh.
To prove that a router is always able to route a packet, it is necessary to
verify that no route-failure gate rendezvous occurs. Since these gates are not
hidden during parallel composition, it is straightforward to check their existence
in each LTS. Table 1 shows that no transitions are labeled with route-failure
labels, which proves verification task (2).
The transition labels in Table 1 show that with one failure link in the network,
packets may be dropped, namely when the attempt to make an illegal turn
potentially could cause a deadlock. Therefore, in a highly congested network,
dropping packets is likely to happen. On the other hand, the routing algorithm
should not drop any packets if making an illegal turn is safe. One simplification
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for checking this property is to have only one node generate only one packet, and
verify that no packet-drop labels exist on each model’s LTS. For each link failure
location shown in Table 1, the packet can be generated in any of the four nodes.
Therefore, this property is thoroughly checked in all 36 possible models. No
drop-packet label is found in all LTS’s, which proves that no packet is dropped
when there is only one packet in the network.
6 Discussion
The construction and refinement of the two-by-two NoC model taught us several
valuable lessons. The counterclockwise routing example reveals a packet leakage
path in the arbiters that instructs their preceding routers to drop the packet. This
leakage stems from the arbiter’s specification, in that each arbiter must check its
succeeding router’s availability before it can receive a packet from another router.
For example, arb W 11 must check with r E 01 before it receives a packet from
either r PE 11 or r S 11. Otherwise, if the arbiter does not receive its succeeding
router’s acknowledgement, it sends a “drop” signal to its preceding router. This
option is modeled simply as the arbiter sending back the “drop” signal, which
opens the path for packet leakage. The second lesson is that it is necessary for
an arbiter to have a buffering capacity for the proposed routing architecture
because an arbiter does not need to guarantee the availability of its succeeding
router before it receives a packet. It is this idea that leads us to redesign the
arbiters, such as the one shown in Figure 5. Without formal analysis, it would
have been very challenging to discover the diagnostic information that shows
these flaws in our arbiter design.
The state explosion problem encountered during the evolutions of our NoC
models inspired us to come up with an adequate data abstraction. This process
provided us with a deeper understanding of the routing algorithm. The resultant
changes on the router and arbiter models show interesting symmetries that we
thought did not exist before. Previous attempts to find symmetries between two
nodes did not succeed due to the mismatch in terms of illegal turns made in
different nodes. With the data abstraction, routers can be categorized into RI0,
RI1, and RI2, as described previously, and each category corresponds to one
type of arbiter, as well. The relative positions and connections between these
routers and arbiters in Figure 1 show strong symmetries between the clockwise
and counterclockwise cycles. Experiences gained in this process may help us to
develop heuristics to automate the search for symmetries in the LNT model
description so that the model checking effort can be reduced by focussing on
representatives from each symmetry group. Efficient state reduction techniques
can potentially allow us to perform model checking on larger-scale networks.
With the data abstraction presented in this paper, our results verify deadlock
freedom and one-link-fault tolerance of the proposed routing algorithm, demon-
strating its robustness. As for its efficiency, our results prove that a packet never
gets dropped when it is the only one in the network. Our preliminary experi-
ments show that even when one node generates only two packets, it is possible
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that the first packet occupies the output link of the second, which attempts to
make an illegal turn and gets dropped due to deadlock avoidance. Therefore, it
is a challenging task to justify the performance of the routing algorithm in terms
of packet drop rate due to deadlock avoidance in the current setting. Since it is
directly related to the link failure probability, performance evaluation requires
annotations of link failure probability in the model and stochastic model check-
ing techniques are needed to provide a quantitative measure of its performance.
Another challenge is that with the current data abstraction, proving delivery of
every packet is difficult, since it is possible that some, if not all, packets pro-
duced get continuously dropped in the network. A simple solution would be to
allocate a unique identifier to each packet and check them on both the pro-
duction and absorption ends, but the resultant state space is likely to become
unmanageable. A more suitable data abstraction scheme and more advanced
state reduction techniques, such as on-the-fly model checking [23], are needed to
meet this challenge.
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